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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOUL AND SPIRIT
IN GREEK AND LATIN PATRISTIC THOUGHT
Alexey R. Fokin

Some biblical texts suggest that man consists of two parts—body and soul—
whereas others seem to indicate instead three parts—body, soul, and spirit.
This paper examines how the Church Fathers dealt with this apparent contradiction. It finds that although they generally favor the body-soul dichotomy,
they did not see it as contradicting a trichotomous view, for “spirit” can be
interpreted in a number of ways: as another term for the soul, or as the lowest
imaginative part of the soul, or as its highest rational part, or as the grace of the
Holy Spirit. Different approaches can be found in different patristic authors
depending on their theological interests and the biblical passages at issue.

I
The structure of human nature became a subject of investigation for the
first time among the Greek philosophers, who were interested not only in
the nature of the relationship between the material body and immaterial
soul and the interaction between them, but also in the internal structure
of the soul. For example, there is Plato’s well-known division of the human soul into three parts or faculties, reason, passion, and desire (logikon,
thymoeides, epithymētikon),1 and Aristotle’s division of the soul into three
parts, rational, sensitive, and nutritive (dianoētikon, aisthētikon, threptikon).2
Plato moreover distinguished two different elements in the rational part
of the soul―namely the reason (logos) and the intellect (nous): the former
is a faculty of discursive thinking or reasoning (dianoia), and the latter is
a faculty of intuitive thinking or intellection (noēsis).3 Subsequently the
Neoplatonists associated reason with the universal Soul, whose parts they
considered the individual souls, and intellect with the universal Intellect,
which emanates directly from the First Principle of the Universe and contains in itself the so-called intelligible world (kosmos noētos).4
Aristotle also identifies a “passive intellect” (nous pathētikos), which is
one of the cognitive faculties of the soul, usually dormant (when a man is
focused only on the external sensible world), but awakens when the soul
Plato. Resp. 439 d 4–e 5; 440 e 3; Phaedr. 253 c–254 e.
Aristoteles. De anima II 2, 413 b 10–15.
3
Plato. Resp. 509 d 1–511 e 4; 533 e 7–534 a 8.
4
Plotinus. Enn. V.1.2–7; V.2.1–2; V.3.2–17.
1
2
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tries to apprehend something immaterial. Aristotle posed the question as
to what indeed wakes up this dormant passive intellect, coming to the conclusion that it must be a certain “active intellect” (nous poiētikos) which does
not belong to the soul itself, but is an immortal, independent, and probably
even divine substance. Thus there is some active entity in the human soul,
which does not belong wholly to it, but is a part of the divine world.5
Similarly, the Stoics considered soul and mind (nous) as two different
levels of organization of the so-called pneuma (spirit), which is a universal
creative rational Principle. They regarded the human mind as the more
fiery, intense, and divine pneuma, and the human soul as the more cold
and less intense pneuma.6
II
Although the question of the structure of human nature and of its spiritual
part first arose in Greek philosophy, it did not remain a purely philosophical question, but with the spread of the new world religion, Christianity, it very soon acquired a theological dimension. In fact, in the Bible we
can see different and even mutually contradictory descriptions of human
beings. On the one hand, human beings are quite often identified only
according to their physical part as “flesh.” For instance, in the book of
Genesis God says: My Spirit does not strive in men forever, for they are flesh;
and their days shall be one hundred twenty years (Gen 6:3).7 The apostle Paul
in the Epistle to the Romans writes: Therefore by the deeds of the law no flesh
(namely no man) will be justified in His (i.e., God’s) sight (Rom 3:20). On the
other hand, human beings are also sometimes described only according
to their spiritual part as “soul” (Hebrew neþeš, Greek psychē). For instance,
in the book of Genesis it is said: The sons of Joseph who were born to him in
Egypt were two souls. All the souls of the house of Jacob who went to Egypt
were seventy (Gen 46:27). In the book of Acts we find: Then those who gladly
received his word were baptized; and that day about three thousand souls were
added to them (Act 2:41).
Finally, the Bible frequently mentions two principles of man, physical
and spiritual, a doctrine subsequently in Christian theology called dichotomy. It is important to notice that in such passages the spiritual principle
of man is sometimes called “soul” and sometimes “spirit” (Hebrew rûah,
Greek pneuma). In fact, the book of Genesis in depicting the origin of man
indicates his so-called double creation or the creation of the two parts of
man: the physical part created from the ground, and the other spiritual
part given to man directly from God by means of creative inspiration: And
the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils
the breath of life; and man became a living soul (Gen 2:7). Ecclesiastes in this
Aristoteles. De anima III 5, 430 a 14–25.
See Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta. I 135, 137–138; II 439–444, 458, 836–841.
7
Quotations from the Bible are based on the King James Version, with some modifications.
5
6
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way describes the death of man: Then the dust shall return to the earth as it
was; and the spirit shall return to God who gave it (Eccl 12:7). In the Gospel the
Lord Jesus says to the apostles: And you fear not them who kill the body, but
are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him who is able to destroy both soul
and body in hell (Mt 10:28). The apostle Paul quite often uses dichotomic
language, for instance, in the first Epistle to the Corinthians: The unmarried
woman cares about the things of the Lord, that she may be holy both in body and
in spirit (1 Cor 7:34).
From these and some other biblical passages8 it would appear that the
soul and the spirit are two different names of the same spiritual part of
human nature. But at the same time, in the Epistles of the apostle Paul we
can find some passages in which the soul appears as something different
from the spirit, and in the structure of human nature three parts are noted:
body, soul, and spirit. This doctrine was subsequently called trichotomy.
For example, in the first Epistle to the Thessalonians it is said: And the very
God of peace sanctify you wholly; and let your whole spirit and soul and body be
preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ (1 Th 5:23). Another passage is found in the Epistle to the Hebrews9: For the word of God
is quick, and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, penetrating even
to the division of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner
of the thoughts and intents of the heart (Heb 4:12). In addition, the apostle
Paul divides people into three classes: “fleshly,” “psychic,” and “spiritual”
(Rom 8:4–9; 1 Cor 2:14–15, 15:44–49).
Thus, reasoning from the biblical data, should we conclude that human beings consist of soul and spirit, or of body, soul, and spirit? Which
doctrine is correct: dichotomy or trichotomy? In other words, should we
think that soul and spirit are two different independent parts of man
or even two different substances? Or should we think that one of them
belongs to man, and the other does not, being a certain superior principle? Perhaps they differ from one another in some other way? Perhaps
there is no difference between them at all? These questions, originating
from the biblical doctrine of human nature, became the subject of long
discussions among Christian theologians, who tried to resolve them by
means of philosophical methods and concepts already worked out in
Greek philosophy.
We shall examine the answers given to these questions in the writings
of Christian theologians of the Patristic period, known as the “golden
age” of the christian Church. It is expedient to divide this large period
into two parts: first, the Pre-Nicene period (till 325 A.D.), when the question of human nature’s structure and of the relationship between soul and
spirit had just arisen and Christian thinkers made their first attempts to
resolve it; and second, the classical Patristic and early Medieval period
See, for instance, Jn 10:15, 17; 19:30; Lk 8:55; 23:46; Mt 27:50; Acts 20:10.
Concerning the Epistle to the Hebrews, the authorship of the apostle Paul is disputed by
modern western Biblical scholars but traditionally admitted by the Orthodox Church.
8
9
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(from the fourth to eighth centuries), when this question was finally
resolved in the writings of the Church Fathers and the decisions of the
Church Councils.
III
The first Christian theologians, the so-called Apostolic Fathers, simply
quoted the related New Testament passages without any attempt to define what they mean. For instance, St. Ignatius of Antioch (also known as
Ignatius Theophorus) simply lists the three parts of man: “Whom the Lord
Jesus Christ will respect, in whom they hope by flesh, and soul, and spirit
[in] faith, and love, and concord.”10 In one edition of the Epistle of St. Ignatius to Polycarp, bishop of Smyrna, soul and spirit are identified with
each other and the biblical dichotomy is confirmed: “You consist of soul
and body [as] fleshly and spiritual in order to improve what is evident
personally to you, but ask for manifestation of the invisible to you.”11 In
one of the anonymous homilies attributed to another apostolic Father, St.
Clement of Rome, spirit is again identified with soul: “Universal and earthly
soul . . . joins with a cognate spirit, which is the human soul.”12
The first attempts to posit a distinction between the human soul and
spirit were undertaken by the Christian apologists; in so doing they used
not only biblical material but also contemporary philosophical and even
physiological doctrines. In the treatise “On Resurrection” sometimes attributed to one of the first Greek apologists, St. Justin the Philosopher, we
find the following: “The soul exists in the body, and it does not live inanimate; you see that the body after it is left by the soul does not exist
any more. For the body is a dwelling of soul, and the soul is a dwelling
of the spirit. These three will be saved in those who have a firm hope and
doubtless faith in God.”13 Nevertheless St. Justin in his other writings recognizes only two parts of man—soul and body.14 At the same time he distinguishes the soul which only participates in life from a certain “spirit of
life” (to zōtikon pneuma) due to which it lives and which can be taken away
from it by the will of God: “For to live is not an attribute of the soul, as it is
God’s; but as a man does not live always, and the soul is not forever conjoined with the body, since, whenever this harmony must be broken up,
the soul leaves the body, and the man exists no longer; even so, whenever
the soul must cease to exist, the spirit of life is removed from it, and there
is no more soul, but it goes back to the place from whence it was taken.”15
The spirit of life mentioned here for St. Justin is not identical to the Holy

Ign. Ant. Philad. 11.2; cf.: Pseudo-Just. De resurr. 10; Hipp. Comm. in Dan. II.38.5.
Ign. Ant. Polyc. 2.2.
12
Ps.-Clem. Hom. 9.12.4.
13
Just. De resurr. // Corpus apologetarum Christianorum saeculi secundi. Vol. 3. P. 595A.
14
Just. 1 Apol. 19.7; 2 Apol. 10.1; Dial. cum Tryph. 5–6.
15
Just. Dial. cum Tryph. 6.
10
11
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Spirit, since it is inherent to all souls whereas the Holy Spirit joins only
with righteous souls.16
The disciple of St. Justin, another Christian apologist, Tatian the Assyrian, distinguished two kinds of spirit, the lowest “material spirit” (pneuma
hylikon), also named soul, and the “the highest spirit” (to meizon pneuma)
which existed in the first people but is today present only in holy men.
Tatian calls the latter “the image and similitude of God” and “the Divine
spirit” (to theion pneuma), evidently identifying it with the Holy Spirit.17 In
a similar way another apologist, St. Theophilus of Antioch, makes a distinction between soul and the “spirit of God” (pneuma theou), which however
he does not identify with the Holy Spirit, because God gave it to all creatures just as He gave soul to all human beings. It is instead a spirit giving
life to all living creatures and inhaled by men.18
One of the first representatives of the Alexandrian theological school,
Clement of Alexandria, renders his own account of the relationship between
soul and spirit. He distinguishes the rational soul (psychē logikē), which he
also calls “the governing spirit” (to hēgemonikon pneuma), from the “corporal soul” (sōmatikē psychē), which he calls “the spiritual principle given in
creation,” “the fleshly spirit,” “the unreasonable spirit,” “the subordinated spirit,” and the “vital force.”19 Each of these spirits has its own origin:
the subordinated vital spirit is transmitted through the seed during the
carnal conception of a man, and the governing rational spirit is given from
heaven by God through the angels.20
Another well-known Alexandrian theologian, Origen of Alexandria, made
an attempt to introduce into Christian theology his own philosophical doctrine on the pre-existence of souls. According to Origen, before the creation of the visible corporal world God had created the immaterial rational
substances—pure spirits (pneumata), or pure intellects, some of whom after
abandoning their love for God and spontaneously falling from Heaven became souls (psychai), namely “cooled spirits,” which required various bodies for their existence.21 However, as early as in the third century this doctrine was considered non-Christian and heretical because it distorted the
biblical doctrine on the creation of man and reproduced pagan philosophical ideas.22 Despite his concept of soul as fallen spirit, Origen sometimes
Ibid. 5.
See Tatian. Orat. ad Graec. 4, 12–13, 15, 20; cf. Orig. De princ. III.4.2.
18
Theoph. Ad Autol. I.5, 7; II.13.
19
Clem. Alex. Strom. VI.6.52; VI.16.134–135; VII.12.79; cf. Leont. Byz. Contra Nestorianos et
Eutychianos I // PG T. 86. Col. 1296D–1297A.
20
Clem. Alex. Strom. VI.16.135; IV.26.167; Eclog. prophet. 50.1–3; Quis div. salv. 33; ср. Hypotyp. // Phot. Biblioth. 109.
21
Origen. De princ. I.7.4; I.8.1; I.8.4; II.3.1; II.8.3–4; II.9.6–7; III.5.4; Comm. in Jn. II.30.181–
182; XX.7 etc.
22
See: Iren. Adv. haer. II.33.1–5; Tert. De anima, 4, 24; Hipp. Refut. VIII.10.1–2; Method.
Olymp. De resurr. 2–3; Petrus Alexandr. Demonstratio quod anima corpori non praeexstiterit
// PG. 18. Col. 520C–521A.
16
17
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regards the soul as “something middle” (quasi medium quoddam) between
flesh and spirit and asserts that the human being consists of body, soul,
and spirit.23 To this statement he connects his famous doctrine on the triple
sense of the Holy Scriptures: just as a man consists of a body, soul, and
spirit, so the Holy Scriptures have three senses: the lowest, firsthand and
literal sense, the middle, psychical sense, and the highest, spiritual sense.24
The Gallic theologian, St. Irenaeus of Lyons, who is usually considered
one of the main representatives of trichotomy, made an alternative distinction between soul and spirit. According to St. Irenaeus, “There are three
things out of which the complete man is composed—flesh, soul, and spirit.
One of these does indeed preserve and shape [the man]—this is the spirit;
while to another it is united and formed—that is the flesh; then [comes]
that which is between these two—that is the soul, which sometimes indeed, when it follows the spirit, is raised up by it, but sometimes sympathizes with the flesh and falls into carnal lusts.25 In this case as in many
others, St. Irenaeus identifies the spirit with the Spirit of God (Spiritus Dei)
and the Spirit of the Father (Spiritus Patris), namely with the Holy Spirit
who Himself is Life (vita),26 unlike the soul, which is only “the breath of
life” (flatus vitae).
Another tendency is found in the writings of well-known Latin apologist Tertullian who in his treatise “On the Soul” for the first time tried to
develop a full Christian doctrine on the soul.27 Although sometimes Tertullian only reiterates biblical expressions concerning man’s trichotomy of
body, soul, and spirit,28 in most cases he clearly teaches that “the human
being consists of two substances (ex duabus substantiis), the body and the
soul.”29 Moreover, in this treatise he unequivocally asserts the complete
identity between soul and spirit, the latter being understood as a function
of breathing inherent in the soul. He writes:
Some maintain that there is another natural substance [besides the soul],
the spirit inherent to [man] (aliam substantiam naturalem inesse spiritum), as
if to have life (vivere)—the function which comes from the soul (ab anima)—
were one thing, and to emit breath (spirare)—the function which comes from
the spirit (a spiritu)—were another thing. Now it is not in all animals that
these two functions are found, for there are many which only live but do not
breathe in that they do not possess the organs of respiration, that is, lungs
and windpipes. . . . Man, indeed, although organically furnished with lungs
and windpipes, will not on that account be proved to breathe by one pro23
Idem. De princ. II.8.4; III.4.1–3; IV.2.4; Dial. Heracl. 3; Comm. in Matth. XVII.27; Comm.
in Joann. XXXII.2.
24
Idem. De princ. IV.2.4–5. Sometimes Origen regards the spirit as the highest part of the
soul, which is mind. See: Idem. Philocalia 12.1; Com. in Ep. ad Ephes. 19 etc.
25
Iren. Adv. haer. V.9.1.
26
Idem. Adv. haer. V.6.1; V.7.1; V.9.1–4 и др.
27
Tert. De anima 22.
28
Idem. Contr. Marc. V.15.
29
Idem. IV. 37; cp. De resurr. carn. 34; Scorp. 9; De paenit. 3.
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cess, and to live by another. . . . For to live is to breathe, and to breathe is to
live (vivere spirare est et spirare vivere est). Therefore this entire process, both
of breathing and living, belongs to that to which living belongs—that is, to
the soul. Well, then, since you separate the spirit [from the soul], separate
their operations also. Let each of them accomplish some act apart from the
other—the soul apart, the spirit apart. Let the soul live without the spirit;
let the spirit breathe without the soul. Let one of them quit the body, let the
other remain; let death and life meet and agree. If indeed the soul and the
spirit are two, they may be divided; and thus, by the separation of the one
which departs from the one which remains, there would accrue the union
and meeting together of life and of death. But such a union never will happen; therefore they are not two, and they cannot be divided; but divided they
might have been, if they had been two. . . . How much firmer ground you
have for believing that the soul and the spirit are but one, since you assign to
them no difference; so that the soul is itself the spirit (ipsa sit anima spiritus),
respiration being the function of that of which life also is!30

Apart from the main stream of the theological tradition of the Church
there were the various Gnostic systems of the first two centuries A.D. In many
cases they identified soul with spirit or considered it as an emanation (aporroia) or seed (sperma) of a certain divine aeon, or Demiurge, or the lowest
angels.31 For instance, the Gnostic Valentinus and his followers believed that
the body of man (“earthly man”) was created by an evil Demiurge from
worldly matter, the soul (“psychical man”) originated from the inspiration
of the psychical substance of the same Demiurge, and the spirit (“spiritual
man”) was an emanation of the spiritual substance of the lowest aeon of
the divine Plenitude, the so called Sophia-Hachamoth.32 Another Gnostic,
Saturninus, thought that the body of man was created by certain angels
but received a vivificating soul from the highest Power as “a spark of life”
(scintilla vitae) consubstantial with this Power.33 The Gnostic Basilides and
his disciple Isidorus believed that human beings have two different souls,
one good and the other evil, and also many spirits34―a thesis subsequently
reiterated by the Manicheans. However, all these strange doctrines contradicted the Bible in many ways and were in fact religious and philosophical
myths, so that they were very soon refuted by such outstanding Christian
theologians as St. Irenaeus of Lyons, St. Clement of Alexandria, and St. Hippolytus of Rome, and also subsequently rejected by the christian Church.
IV
On the basis laid down in the Pre-Nicene period, Christian theologians of
the classical Patristic and early Medieval period succeeded in giving clear
Idem. De anima. 10.
See: Iren. Adv. Haer. I.5.5–6; I.7.3; I.24.1, 4; I.25.1; I.26.1; II.19.7; Tert. Adv. Valent. 24–29;
Clem. Alex. Exc. ex Theod. III.50.2–3.
32
See: Iren. Adv. Haer. I.5.5–6; Tert. Adv. Valent. 24–25.
33
See: Iren. Adv. Haer. I.24.1.
34
See: Clem. Alex. Strom. II.20.113–114; ср. Orig. De princ. III.4.1–2.
30
31
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and definite solutions to the question concerning the structure of human
nature and relationship between soul and spirit.
First of all we see that all authoritative Church theologians in their dogmatic statements strictly upheld the dichotomy and unanimously taught
that human beings consist of two different parts, principles or substances—of soul and body. In so doing they recognized in man only one spiritual principle and did not regard soul and spirit as two independent spiritual principles or substances.35 Indeed, according to the definition of St.
Gregory of Nyssa, “he who consists of intelligent soul and body (ek psychēs
noeras kai sōmatos) is called man.”36 St. Gregory calls these two parts following St. Paul “the outer and the inner man,”37 or following the apostle
Peter “the visible and the hidden man.”38 St. Augustine of Hippo expresses
a similar opinion: “Man is not a body alone, nor a soul alone, but a being
composed of both. It is indeed true, that the soul is not the whole man,
but the better part of man; the body not the whole, but the inferior part of
man; and that then, when both are joined, they receive the name of man.”39
Similarly John the Grammarian, presbyter of Caesarea, writes: “Everything
that is equally observed in many and does not exist more in one and less in
the other, is called essence. As every individual man is indifferently flesh
animated by the rational soul, and this is humanity, accordingly we call
humanity one essence although it is a sign of the two essences.”40
At the same time it is important to notice that this dichotomy was not
simply a product of abstract theoretical conclusions, but from the very
35
In the Eastern Church this opinion was maintained by St. Аthanasius the Great (Contra
Gentes 3, 30, 32–33; De incarn. 17.3; Tomus ad Antioch. 7); St. Basil the Great (Hom. 3.7 // S.Y.
Rudberg, 1962. P. 35.17–18; Hom. Ps. 32 // PG. 29. Col. 337D); St. Gregory of Nazianzus (Or.
40.8; Ep. 101.19; Carm. moral. 10.111–114 // PG. 37. Col. 688A); St. Gregory of Nyssa (Or. Cat.
6.34–42; 37.1–2; De op. hom. 29; Adv. Apoll. // GNO. III.1. P. 133.25–30; 185.15–21; De or. Dom.
IV // Oehler. S. 274.25–276.6; De an. et res. // PG. 46. Col. 69D–72А); St. Cyril of Jerusalem (Cyr.
Hier. Catech. 3.4; 4.18); St. John Chrysostom (In Gen. Hom. 13.2; 21.6); St. Cyril of Alexandria
(Com. in Joann. II.1 // Vol. 1. P. 219; Com. in Malach. II // Vol. 2. P. 596; De incarn Unigen. // P.
679); St. Theodoret of Cyrus (Quaest. in Gen. 23; Haer. fab. comp. V.9; Eranist. // P. 112–113); St.
Leontius of Byzantium (Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos I // PG T. 86. Col. 1281AB, 1296C);
St. Maximusus the Confessor (Amb. 2 (7) // PG. 91. Col. 1092B; Amb. 35 // Col. 1153A; Quaest.
ad Thalas. 33.26; 43.33–34; Mystag. 5.1–2); St. John of Damascus (Exp. fidei II.12 (26); IV.9 (82);
Contr. Jacob. 56.1–2; De nat. composit. 7.6–8); St. Photius of Constantinople (Amphil. Qu. 73 //
PG. 101. Col. 453A; Qu. 230 // Col. 1292А; Com. in Matth. Fr. 25) etc.; in the Western Church
by St. Hilary of Poitiers (Tr. in Ps. 129.4–6; De Trinit. X.19; X.57); St. Ambrose of Milan (De
Abraham I.4.29; Expositio Euang. sec. Lucam II.79; De inst. virg. III.17); St. Jerome (Com. in
Zachar. 12.1; Tract. in psalm. 127 // PL. 26. Col. 1291C; Dial. contr. Pelag. III.11); St. Augustine
(De beata vita 2; De quantit. anim. 1.2; De divers. quaest. 7; Confess. X.6.9; De Genesi ad litt.
VI.11); St. John Cassian (Cassian. Coll. 4.10); St. Vincent of Lérins (Commonit. 13); Gennadius of
Marseille (De eccl. dogm. 14–16); St. Gregory the Great (Moralia XVIII.18; XXXV.16); St. Isidore
of Seville (De differen. rer. 46); St. Bede the Venerable (In Lucae Euang. Exp. IV.12) etc.
36
Greg. Nyss. Adv. Apoll. // GNO. III.1. P. 133.25–30; ср. Ibid. P. 185.9–26; Or. Cat., 6.34–42;
De or. Dom., IV // Oehler. S. 274.25–276.6; De an. et res. // PG 46. Col. 69D–72А.
37
Idem. Adv. Apoll. // GNO. III.1. P. 185.15–21.
38
Idem. De op. hom. 29; De an. et res. // PG 46. Col. 72D.
39
August. De civitate Dei XIII.24; cf. Ep. 238.2 etc.
40
Joann. Gramm. Apol. concil. Chalced. 1.

SOUL AND SPIRIT IN GREEK AND LATIN PATRISTIC THOUGHT

607

beginning was closely connected with Christian soteriology and asceticism. In fact, St. Gregory the Theologian in his famous sermon on holy
Baptism says, “Since we are double-made, I mean [we consist] of body
and soul, and of the visible and invisible natures, so the cleansing [in the
baptism] also is twofold, by water and the Spirit; the one received visibly
in the body, the other concurring with it invisibly and apart from the
body; the one typical, the other real and cleansing the depths.”41 St. John
Chrysostom, commenting on the story from the book of Genesis concerning the creation of man, says: “Tell me whether we do not consist of two
substances (apo dyo ousiōn), that is, of soul and body? Why then do we
take unequal care of the former and the latter, trying in every possible
way to please the body . . . while neglecting care of the soul?»42
The dichotomy is even more evident in the Christological doctrine of
the Church produced during the long Christological disputes of the V–VII
centuries. Indeed, when they are talking about the completeness of the
human nature of Jesus Christ, the incarnated God the Word, practically all
orthodox polemicists of that age agree that He consists of “flesh, animated
by both a rational and an intelligent soul” (sarx epsychōmenē psychē logikē
kai noera), namely a soul possessing reason (logos) and intellect (nous).43 For
instance, the outstanding Byzantine philosopher and theologian St. Maximus the Confessor says that God the Word “by Himself became man, that
is, took flesh possessing both an intelligent and rational soul.”44 Another
famous Byzantine theologian, St. John of Damascus, in his treatise An Exact
Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, which is considered a summa of orthodox
patristic theology and which became a prototype of the well-known medieval Libri Sententiarum, writes as follows:
God the Word omitted none of the things which He implanted in our nature when He formed us in the beginning, but took them all upon Himself,
body and soul both intelligent and rational, and all their properties. For the
creature that is devoid of one of these [properties] is not man. But God the
Word in His fullness took upon Himself [man] in his fullness, and was united whole to whole that He might in His grace bestow salvation on the whole
man. For what has not been assumed cannot be healed.45

In the no less authoritative doctrinal treatise, Doctrine of the Fathers on
the Incarnation of the Word, written in the seventh century by an anonymous
41
Greg. Naz. Or. 40.8. Ср. Cyril. Hier. Catech. ad illum. 3.4; Joann. Damasc. Exp. fidei II.11
(25); IV.9 (82).
42
Joann. Chrysost. In Gen. Hom. 21.6.
43
Didym. Caec. Fragm. in Ps. Fr. 215; Cyr. Alex. Ep. ad Nestor. // ACO Vol. I.1.1. P. 26; De
sancta Trinit. // PG. 77. Col. 1141; Justinian. Edict. rectae fidei // P. 132, 144, 148; Joann. Gramm.
Apol. concil. Chalced. 1; Cap. contr. monophys. 1; Maximus. Confess. Quaest. ad Thalas. 20,
42, 63; Joann. Damasc. Exp. fidei III.6 (50); De duabus in Christo voluntatibus, 9; Contr. Jacob.
68; Or. de imag. I.1.16; Doctrina Patrum // P. 70–71.
44
Maximus. Confess. Quaest. ad Thalas. 20.
45
Joann. Damasc. Exp. fidei III.6 (50). See also: De duabus in Christo volunt., 9; Contr. Jacob. 68; Or. de imag. I.1.16 etc.
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author (presumably by St. Anastasius the Sinaite), we similarly read:
“Christ has taken not a part of human essence, such as only flesh without
rational soul, as Apollinaris says, but the entire human essence, that is,
flesh animated by both rational and intelligent soul. For only this essence,
which perfectly belongs to every individual man, should be rightly called
[human] essence.”46
Thus we can see that Christian theologians of the classical Patristic period strictly upheld the dichotomy, believing that human nature consists
of two principles, soul and body, and not of three or more principles. But
how did they understand human spirit, which is frequently mentioned in
the Bible and in the writings of previous theologians? And what in that
case did they think about the unity of the spiritual principle of man?
In resolving these problems and defining the spirit in human nature,
Christian theologians quite often pointed out that in the Bible the term
‘spirit’ has many different meanings. Indeed spirit in connection with
human beings is frequently considered a synonym of soul and identified with it.47 For instance, St. Cyril of Jerusalem in his famous Catechetical Homilies remarks that “the name of spirit is given to different things
. . . For many things are called spirits. Thus an angel is called a spirit,
our soul is called a spirit, and this wind which is blowing is called a
spirit; great virtue also is spoken of as spirit; and impure practice is
called spirit; and the devil our adversary is called spirit. Beware therefore when you hear these things, lest from their having a common name
you mistake one for another. For concerning our soul the Scripture says:
His spirit shall go forth, and he shall return to his earth (Ps 145:4); and of
the same soul it says again: Who formed the spirit of man within him (Zec
12:1).»48 The same point is made by St. Augustine in his Commentaries
on the book of Genesis,49 by St. Аnastasius the Sinaite in his “Hodegos”
(“Guidebook”),50 and by St. John of Damascus in his Exact Exposition of
the Orthodox Faith.51 Gennadius of Marseille in his treatise “On the Doctrines of the Church,” reiterating Tertullian’s opinion quoted above,
writes: “Spirit is not something third in the substance of man, as asserts
Didymus, but it is the soul [so named] because of its spiritual nature (pro

Doctrina Patrum // P. 70–71.
See: Cyr. Hier. Catech. 16.13; Greg. Naz. Or. 2.17; 38.11; 45.7; Serap. Thmuit. Eucholog. 30.2;
Didym. De Trin. 2.20 // PG. 39. Col. 736A; Olymp. Alex. Com. in Eccl. 4.12 // PG. 93. Col. 492A;
Anastas. Sinait. Viae dux, II.2.2 // PG. 89. Col. 56B; De definit. I.6 // PG. 28. Col. 536D; Joann.
Damasc. Exp. fidei I.13; II.12 (26); Hilar. Pictav. Tr. in Ps. 129.4; Hieronym. Com. in Zachar.
12.1; Com. in Euang. Matth. IV.27.54; August. De Genesi ad litt. VII.28; XII.7; De natura et
orig. anim. II.2.2; Cassian. Coll. 7.13; Gennad. Massil. De eccl. dogm. 20; Isidor. Hispal. Etymol.
XI.1.13; Alcuin. De ratione anim. 10 etc.
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spiritali natura), or it is named spirit because it performs respiration in
the body (spiret in corpore).”52
Christian ascetics also confirm this statement concerning the identity of
soul and spirit. For instance, St. John Cassian observes: “For even if spirit is
mingled with this crass and solid matter, namely flesh (as very easily happens), should we therefore believe that it can be united with soul, which
is in like manner spirit, in such a way as to make it also receptive in the
same way of its own nature: a thing which is possible to the [Holy] Trinity alone?”53 Some authoritative theologians, such as St. John Chrysostom
and St. Cyril of Alexandria54 also identify soul and spirit in commenting
on the passage of the apostle Paul’s Epistle to Hebrews where a distinction is found between them (Heb 4:12). Instead of the original reading,
(the word of God) is penetrating even to the division of soul and spirit, they
sometimes read (the word of God) is penetrating even to the division of soul
and body, which better corresponds to the universally accepted dichotomy.
Those who quoted these words of the apostle Paul in their original form
often understood them in the sense of the various conditions, actions, or
parts of the human soul. For instance, St. Маximus the Confessor explains
the words of the apostle Paul as follows: “Passing through all things, the
powerful and living Word [of God] also penetrates the division of soul and
spirit, that is, distinguishes which of [men’s] acts or thoughts are psychical
(psychika), namely natural kinds or movements of virtue, and which are
spiritual (pneumatika), namely supernatural kinds proper only for God,
but given to [human] nature by [Divine] grace.”55 St. Cyril of Alexandria
also remarks that the apostle’s words can be understood in this way: “The
word of God distinguishes and divides parts of the soul (ta tēs psychēs
merē), making it able to comprehend and to understand what it hears.”56
Another opinion also widespread among Christian theologians was the
identification of spirit with the highest part of the human soul, namely the
mind or intellect (nous, mens, intellectus).57 Indeed, St. John of Damascus
Gennad. Massil. De eccl. dogm. 20.
Cassian. Coll. 7.13.
54
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VII // GNO. VI. P. 242.8–9; V. Moys. II.215; De op. hom. 12; De virg. V.1.30–31; Olymp. Alex.
Com. in Eccl. 4.12 // PG. 93. Col. 532C; Anastas. Sinait. Serm. in constit. hom. 1.3 // PG. 44.
Col. 1333BC; Viae dux, II.2.2 // PG. 89. Col. 56B; Maximus. Confess. Amb. 10/2 // PG. 91. Col.
1112B; 10/3 // Col. 1116A; 15 // Col. 1220A; 21 // Col. 1248B; Joann. Damasc. Exp. fidei I.13;
August. De Gen. ad litt. XII 7; De Trinit. XIV 16; De fide et symb. 10; Ep. 238.2. Despite such
unanimous consent of the authoritative Christian theologians, there were some objections to
the identification of human mind and spirit. Thus St. Epiphanius of Cyprus raised objections
in his treatise “Аncoratus” (Epiph. Ancor. 77.3). Yet his intention was not so much to establish
a distinction between mind and spirit as to show that both human mind and spirit are not
independent hypostases, being inseparable from human soul. So if Christ took upon Himself
52
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listing various meanings of the word ‘spirit’ in the Bible says, “Sometimes
the mind is also called spirit.”58 St. Augustine in his Commentaries on the
book of Genesis explains this opinion in detail:
Rational mind itself (ipsa mens rationalis) is called spirit (spiritus), which has
a kind of eye of the soul (oculus animae), possessing an image of God and
knowledge of God. Therefore the apostle says: be renewed in the spirit of your
mind (spiritu mentis vestrae), and put on the new man, which is created according
to God (Eph 4:23–24). And in the other place he speaks about the inner man:
Which is renewed in knowledge according to the image of Him Who created him
(Col 3:10). And again after he has said: So then with the mind I myself serve the
law of God; but with the flesh ― the law of sin (Rom 7:25), in the other passage
he also remembers this statement: Flesh lusts against the spirit (spiritum), and
the spirit against the flesh . . . so that you cannot do the things that you would (Gal
5:17). What in the first case he has called mind (mentem), in the second case
he has called also spirit (spiritum).59

It should be noted, however, that Augustine also adds another possible
meaning in his treatise On the Trinity: “And we speak also of a spirit in
man distinct from the mind, to which spirit belong the images that are
formed after the likeness of bodies”60; and in another passage he explains:
“Spirit also is a certain faculty of the soul, which is lower than the mind
(vis animae quaedam mente inferior), where the similitudes of corporal things
are impressed.”61 The identity of spirit and intellect is again found in St.
Gregory of Nyssa, who remarks that “in Holy Scripture the governing
principle [of man] (to hēgemonikon) is called by three [names], intellect, or
spirit, or heart, [for it says]: Create in me a clean heart, O God (Ps 50:12); and
a man with intellect shall attain unto government (Prov 1:5; LXX); and Nobody
knows the things of a man, except the spirit of man which is in him (1 Cor 2:11).62
St. Gregory draws upon Aristotle’s division of the soul into three parts63 to
reconcile the dichotomy of body and soul with the trichotomy of the apostle Paul, explaining that the apostle “called the nutritive part [of the soul]
the body, the sensitive part the soul, and the rational part the spirit.”64 Finally St. Anastasius the Sinaite in his “Sermon concerning the Creation of
Man according to the Image and Similitude of God” makes the following
analogy between the structure of the inner man and the Holy Trinity: just
as in the Holy Trinity there is unbegotten and causeless God the Father,
and the Word (Logos) begotten from Him, and the Spirit (Pneuma) proceeding from Him, so in us “there is our soul (psychē) and its intelligent word
a human soul, He also took a human mind, which was denied by the heresiarch Аpollinaris
of Laodicea (ibid.).
58
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(noeros logos) and its mind (nous), which the apostle called ‘spirit,’ when he
ordered us to be holy in soul, body, and spirit.65 For the soul is unbegotten
and causeless according to the image of the causeless God the Father; and
its intelligent word is not unbegotten but ineffably, invisibly, inexplicably,
and passionlessly begotten from it; and the mind is neither causeless, nor
unbegotten, but proceeding, and everywhere penetrating, and observing
and invisibly touching all according to the image and similitude of the
most Holy and proceeding Spirit [of God].”66
Nonetheless, there was one passage in which the Church Fathers found
at least an apparent distinction between the spirit and the mind, the words
of the apostle Paul: I will pray with the spirit, and I will pray with the mind: I
will sing with the spirit, and I will sing with the mind (1 Co 14:15). St. Maximus the Confessor understands these words as follows: “Someone sings
with the spirit when he utters by tongue the words of singing, and sings
with the mind when he understands the power of those words which
are sung.”67 St. John Chrysostom explains them somewhat differently:
“Wherefore [the apostle Paul] also said, ‘If I pray with the tongue, only
my spirit prays,’ namely the [Divine] gift which is given me (to charisma to
dothen moi) and which moves my tongue; ‘but my mind is unfruitful.’”68
It was in accordance with the latter opinion that many authoritative
Christian theologians also developed the view, already pointed out in the
apologists and St. Irenaeus of Lyons, that “spirit” sometimes can mean a
certain supernatural condition of the human soul, when it aspires completely toward God and is filled with the grace of the Holy Spirit.69 Besides
the words of St. John Chrysostom quoted above, we find this opinion in
the writings of the famous ascetic teacher St. Маcarius of Egypt, who says
in his Spiritual Homilies: “The soul perfectly enlightened by the ineffable
beauty of the glory of the light of the Face of Christ and perfectly communicated with the Holy Spirit and honored to become a dwelling and
a throne of God, itself becomes wholly eye, and wholly light, and wholly
face, and wholly glory, and wholly becomes spirit.»70 We also find an exact
doctrinal definition of this opinion in the treatise of Gennadius of Marseille, “On the doctrines of the Church”: “Spirit, which is mentioned by
the apostle as the third alongside soul and body, is grace of the Holy Spirit
(gratia Spiritus Sancti).”71
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Nonetheless, only a few among Christian theologians of the classical
Patristic period distinguished between soul and spirit as between two
independent principles or substances. Among them are heresiarch Apollinaris of Laodicea and the Origenist Didymus the Blind, who taught that
man consists of three different substances: body, animal soul, and rational
soul or spirit.72 Their contemporary, the Latin Christian philosopher and
theologian Marius Victorinus, supposed that man has two souls: one is “divine,” possessing the intellect (anima divinior cum suo nōi), and the other
is material, possessing sensible and vital forces (potentia sensibilis); like
Clement of Alexandria, Victorinus believed that each of these souls has its
own origin.73 The Manicheans maintained an opinion similar to that of the
Gnostics, namely that there are two kinds of the human souls—good and
evil.74 Refuting some of these views, St. Theodoret of Cyrus wrote: “Apollinaris of Laodicea says that man consists of three [parts]: body, animal
soul, and rational soul, which he calls mind. But the Divine Scriptures
recognize only one and not two souls, as they clearly teach [in the history] of the creation of the first man.”75 A similar objection we can find
in the treatise of Gennadius of Marseille mentioned above: “We do not
say that there are two souls in man, as Jacob and other Syrian disputants
write, one psychical (animalis) which animates the body and is mixed with
blood, and the other spiritual (spiritalis) governing the reason. But we say
there is one and the same soul in man, which vivifies the body by union
with it and disposes itself by its reason, having in itself free will to select
by reasoning what it wants.”76 Finally we can find a complete definition of
the Church theologians’ opinion concerning the relationship between soul
and spirit in the writings of Olympiodorus, a lesser-known Alexandrian
exegete who lived at the end of the sixth and beginning of the seventh
century. He writes:
It is said, that man consists of three [parts]—soul, body, and spirit—nevertheless the spirit is not something other by its substance than the soul; for
there are not in man two rational principles, but we say that the spirit differs
from the soul only in conception (kat’ epinoian), and we call spirit the easilymovable and highest [part] of the soul. And I think it is the mind (nous). Or
the spirit is a spiritual grace (pneumatikon charisma), enlightening and illuminating our souls.77

The question of the unity of the soul also became a subject of special
discussion at the Fourth Constantinopolitan Council of 869/870 A.D. (also
known as the Eighth Ecumenical Council). Its eleventh canon defines:
72
See: Greg. Nyss. Adv. Apoll. // GNO. III.1. P. 185.10–12; Theodoret. Eranist. // P. 112; Didym.
De Sp. St. 54, 55, 59; De Trin. 1.9; 1.15; 3.31; Gennad. Massil. De eccl. dogm. 20.
73
Mar. Vict. Adv. Ar., I.62. 11–14; 26–37.
74
See: August. De duab. anim. adv. Manich. 1.1; 13.19 etc.; сf. Nemes. De nat. hom. 2.
75
Theodoret. Eranist. // Ed. G.H. Ettlinger. Oxford, 1975. P. 112–113.
76
Gennad. Massil. De eccl. dogm. 15.
77
Olymp. Alex. Com. in Eccl. 4.12 // PG. 93. Col. 532C; cf. Com. in Job 12.9–10.

SOUL AND SPIRIT IN GREEK AND LATIN PATRISTIC THOUGHT

613

“Though the Old and New Testament teach that man possesses one both
rational and intelligent soul (unam animam rationabilem et intelligentem), and
all divinely inspired Fathers and Teachers of the Church confirm the same
doctrine, some people thinking out pernicious fables have reached such a
degree of impiety that they shamelessly teach that man has two souls.”78
V
In conclusion, let us summarize the basic principles of the doctrine concerning the structure of human nature and the relationship between soul
and spirit which was developed by Greek and Latin patristic theologians.
Firstly, the basis of this doctrine is biblical anthropology and its particular manner of describing the human being as a body (flesh), or a soul, or
a union of body and soul, or a union of body, soul, and spirit. At the same
time this biblical doctrine in patristic thought was completed and developed by means of philosophical methods and concepts already worked
out in Greek philosophy.
Secondly, it was clearly defined that man consists only of two different
principles or substances: soul and body. In this connection the prevailing
theory was dichotomy (as in Plato and Aristotle), in spite of some trichotomic expressions.
Thirdly, there is in man only one spiritual and rational principle, namely soul possessing many parts or faculties; thus spirit differs from the soul
only in conception, and not in fact.
Fourthly, as a result of the comparative analysis of a considerable number of sources it was established, that the term ‘spirit’ applied to human
nature has at least four different meanings:
(1) first, the soul itself, called spirit because of its spiritual nature or
because of its function of breathing;
(2) second, the lower part of the soul, in which the similitudes of corporal things are impressed (namely, the faculty of imagination or
imprinting);
(3) third, the highest rational part of the soul, namely mind (intellect) or
heart (rarely);
(4) fourth, the Holy Spirit or His grace which may be acquired by the
holy soul.
All these meanings, used by Christian theologians, have their parallels in
Greek philosophy.
Fifthly, thus dichotomy does not contradict trichotomy, but as a rule the
latter is included in the former or is a particular case of it.
Sixthly, the tripartite structure of the spiritual part of man, including (1)
soul, (2) intellect (spirit) and (3) word (logos), is considered an image of the
three Hypostases of the Holy Trinity.
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Seventhly, any introduction alongside the soul of more spiritual principles in man, as was done by the Gnostics, Manicheans, and some particular theologians, such as Apollinaris, Didymus, and Marius Victorinus,
is considered non-Christian and false.
These basic principles of Christian anthropology were subsequently
adopted by medieval Scholastic and Byzantine philosophy and in some
degree by modern philosophy as well―but that subject goes beyond the
scope of the present paper.
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